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I 
The concept of what we may noncommittally call 
forward movement has an all-pervasive significance in 
Hegel's philosophy. Hegelian forward movement is of a 
particular kind; it is dialectical. Whether our realm 
of discourse is the individual, the community, the 
State, or World Spirit, change must be perceived as a 
dialectical forward-moving, and the subject of dis-
course at any particular time must be considered in its 
relationship to the whole, with regard to its position 
and significance within that whole. Dialectical 
change, newness as a manifestation of freedom, and in 
particular the freedom of the natural individual to 
initiate developmental changes in his own life, is that 
with which I will be concerned. 
In "Mental Events", Donald Davidson describes tv/o 
related distinctions which appear at first to be 
contradictions; (1) that between autonomy or freedom 
and causal determinism and, (2) that between the 
anomaly of mental events and the determinate nature of 
physical laws. In the first part of this paper I will 
draw on Davidson's formulation of the former issue as 
derivative of his resolution of the latter in order to 
illustrate how Hegel's notions of freedom and rational-
ity as dialectical, as historically evolving, enable 
him to exhibit these distinctions in an entirely diff-
erent light. 
In "Freedom and Constraint by Norms", Robert 
Brandom develops and extends [1] the Hegelian notion of 
freedom in such a way as to stress the element of 
novelty, as which freedom is freedom to do and express 
new things. In the second part of this paper, I will 
further analyze Hegel's notion of freedom as dialec-
tical, based on some of Brandom's insights, in order to 
228 
emphasize the role which freedom qua expressive has in 
historical development and continuity. 
II 
Events, says Davidson, are either mental or phys-
ical only by description. In the sense that all events 
are described as physical, they can be given purely 
physical explanations, or their explanations can be 
hypothesized within the realm of a purely physical 
theory. Mental events are recognizably different from 
physical events. For one thing, not all events are 
mental, while all events are physical. For another 
thing, allegiance to the 'proper sort of evidence' in 
the explanation of events in the mental realm is an al-
legiance of an entirely different sort than that which 
physical explanation requires. Evidence of a physical 
sort will be operative within the boundaries of a 
(physical) theory; it will both depend upon and sub-
stantiate that theory. Evidence gathered at any time 
may either constitute a demonstration of the con-
sistency of the theory, call for revision of the theory 
within the limits of its major claims, or require an 
overthrow of the theory in favor of another, better 
theory.|2] 
Within the mental realm, events constitute evidence 
for the consistency of a theory, the need for its 
revision, or the necessity of its overhaul in an en-
tirely different way. To interpret mental events is to 
recognize them as constituting a pattern and to com-
prehend that their description is conferred upon them 
by their place in that pattern. Mental events are 
unique in that they represent a continually changing 
and evolving realm. If we are to have a theory about a 
person's thoughts, beliefs, etc., we must accept that 
it will continually have to be revised. The theory it-
self must evolve because the person is not static but 
is changing according to some patterned flow.(3) 
How can we characterize this pattern as which men-
tal events must be viewed? We must recognize, claims 
Davidson, the holism of the mental realm, the fact that 
every belief has been conditioned by previous psy-
chological states (beliefs, desires, hopes, etc.). As 
such, our every interpretation relies on the at-
tribution of rationality to the person whose mental 
states we seek to understand. To attribute some degree 
of consistency and coherence to a person with regard to 
his thoughts and beliefs is just to treat- him as a 
person, to say that in the sense that he is a being 
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whose thoughts are evolving, he is rational, 
purposeful, and free from physical laws. To view the 
mental realm as anomalous, concludes Davidson, is a 
necessary condition for interpreting the actions and 
deeds of persons as autonomous.(4) 
The characterization of an event as mental or phys-
ical only by description is at least superficially ap-
plicable to Hegelian terminology. Contrasts in Hegel-
ian philosophy become poles, having different charac-
ters only contextually, depending on the combination of 
light and shadows in which they are seen. Even in 
their synthesis they have different aspects or sides. 
However, Hegel's account of the person and his mental 
and physical aspects differs fundamentally from 
Davidson's. Whereas for Davidson, all mental events 
can be understood as physical events, for Hegel the 
mental takes precedence and the physical must be 
subsumed. Davidson has asserted that physical events 
are noticeable, law-abiding, and primary, but Hegel 
wants to show that the physical or objective world 
relies totally on the mental. The pole of the mental 
is represented in many different ways in the Hegelian 
system: as subject, as inner realm, as will and 
thought. Each of these is substantiated or concretized 
in its opposite; the object, the outer realm, natural 
necessity. It is because Hegel conceived of the 
element of rationality as primary rather than deriva-
tive that he is able to depict relations in this way. 
The mark of the primacy of the mental realm for 
Hegel is the rationality of the subject. He presumes 
that the individual as subject, as agent, is rational. 
It is this quality which gives sense to his existence 
and which enables him to be understood by others. The 
subject thereby lives a coherent existence in which his 
attitudes toward the world are ever-evolving and 
flowing in a pattern in which each is related both to 
what is to come and what has gone before. What Hegel 
further means by the rationality of the subject is that 
he is such that, as a thinking agent, he extends his 
rationality into the world. This can be understood 
again in the following way: The subject is rational 
because he is imbued through and through with reason, 
and by way of reason he sees his reflection in all 
things. 
Reason. . . . is Substance, as well as Infinite 
Power; its own Infinite Material underlying all 
the natural and spiritual life which it 
originates, as also the Infinite Form- that which 
sets this material in motion. . . . It is the in-
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finite complex of things, their entire Essence 
and truth.(5) 
Reason is apparent everywhere and governs every-
thing. Thus, both the spiritual and natural worlds are 
within the domain of reason in every way. That the 
subject is rational, and that he investigates his ra-
tionality in the world i3 to say that as subject he is 
a manifestation of reason. He is a participant in the 
principles of reason in such a way that he seeks reason 
elsewhere and everywhere, not only in other subjects, 
but also in the natural or physical world. He seeks 
rationality then, in physical objects and events, and 
he finds it there. 
To him who looks upon the world rationally, the 
world in its turn present a rational aspect.(6) 
Hegel thus reverses the Davidsonian dependence 
between mental and physical events. While for David-
son, all events are physical, in the Hegelian system 
all events must ultimately be mental. It is the sub-
ject (his thoughts, beliefs, intentions, desires) to 
which everything has reference, the subject who is 
making his way in the world by locating in the world 
its own rational aspect. The subject, in giving reason 
to the world, finds reason in the world. Without the 
subject, there is mere externality, a disembodied, 
disorganized content waiting to be the content of some 
thought. 
The content of something thought has the form of 
being; but this being is something mediated, 
something established through our activity.[7] 
The allegiance of mental and physical explanations 
to their proper sort of evidence will, in the Hegelian 
system, be allegiance to the same sort of evidence; 
namely, that of reason penetrating both subject and 
object, making the physical world subject to rational 
comprehension by thought, and bringing the content of 
the physical world within the domain of the subject. A 
rational understanding is all-enveloping. Not only 
physical objects but physical laws, and therefore the 
whole realm of physical theory, which Davidson alter-
natively sees as undeniably separate and distinguish-
able, as being not rational but subject to causal 
determinacy, is veritably transformed in Hegel's 
system. The world and its constituents cohere as a 
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rational system, capable of being recognized as ration-
al by the subject. 
To consider a thing rationally means not to bring 
reason to bear on the object from the outside and 
to tamper with it, but to find that the object is 
rational on its own account; here it is mind in 
its freedom, the culmination of self-conscious 
reason, which gives itself actuality and engend-
ers itself as an existing world.(8) 
To distinguish the role of the Hegelian concept of 
freedom we have but to draw on the notion of 
rationality a little bit further. The subject's aware-
ness of his participation in a rational world is not a 
static awareness but an evolving one. For the in-
dividual to come to terms with his rationality is for 
him to become self-conscious. Through a long period of 
seeking involving many changes, the individual progres-
sively discovers that he can look upon both the phys-
ical world, and most importantly himself, as rational; 
his rational content is never once the same as it ever 
was before but its whole path is patterned and 
purposeful. The freedom of the subject is not freedom 
in the Davidsonian sense, from physical laws, but 
freedom to discover rationality in both himself as 
subject, and in the object. Freedom is thus the un-
covering of rational laws for the subject to understand 
and to apply. Hegelian freedom is self-contained exis-
tence, since to be free is to be dependent on nothing 
but oneself, to be primary. 
Thus the individual, as subject, is free, because 
he is rational. The element of reason which is 
manifest throughout existence is apparent to the sub-
ject who is free, v/ho seeks his own rationality, who 
recognizes it, who finds it everywhere, and who brings 
all else that is rational within his domain. To .be 
free moreover, is to perceive the world as working it-
self out in a free and rational way. 
Freedom is precisely that by which the subject 
achieves newness and reaches ever new boundaries. 
Freedom is the basis of exploration and discovery 
within the world such that the same ground is never 
covered twice. Freedom is change, but more than this; 
it is evolution, progression, purposeful movement 
toward goals—i.e. the uncovering of rationality in the 
world and in the self. The basis of an individual's 
achievements is his ability to make free choices and to 
move continually in the direction of self-conscious-
ness. The life of the individual can thus be seen as 
232 
his own history, and the working out of this history, 
its very becoming and its reality, is the progress of 
the consciousness of freedom. 
In sharp contrast with Davidson's portrayal of the 
schism between the mental and physical realms, the 
reduction of all events to physical events, the charac-
ter of the mental as anomalous and the conclusion that 
anomaly is a necessary condition for autonomy, Hegel 
presents a view in which forward movement is essential. 
The Davidsonian outlook appears static; we are in a 
very deep sense dependent on our physical theories and 
their evolution is oddly out of step with our progres-
sion as persons. We are dependent on -the physical 
world and our theories about it, which we must take to 
be true and reliable at any given time. According to 
Hegel, the authority belongs to the subject who con-
stitutes the world and takes it as it is related to 
himself at any given time. As subjects, we constitute 
the movements and the changes, initiating them in our 
freedom and our own self-development. As Charles 
Taylor puts it, here is the Hegelian resolution of the 
conflict between the radical freedom which man em-
phatically takes himself to possess, and an expressive 
fulness, which says that man as a whole, as mind and 
body, as complete, seeks to express his humanity in the 
world.|9) Insofar as every individual seeks self-
consciousness, we have at another level the phenomenon 
of a people or culture. A community of subjects is a 
group of individuals acting in harmony with one another 
so as to express a particular character, to exhibit it-
self as a cultural individual in the context- of 
history, the larger life, so to speak, the life of the 
v/orld. 
Ill 
Freedom, claims Brandom, is an issue that is to be 
seen most clearly in the context of a community, for it 
is the way that the decisions, actions, etc. of the in-
dividual are interpreted by the community that leads to 
considerations as to whether that individual is free or 
not. The regulating factor in intracommunity ap-
preciation is the norm. Norms governing utterances and 
social practices are implicit within the practice of 
the community; in other words, the norms of a community 
are to be taken as what the community responds to as a 
correct performance of a particular practice.[10] To 
be a member of a particular community it is necessary 
that an individual conform to the norms which are 
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evident in the social practices of the community. We 
can treat anyone as a member of our community if and 
when we choose; insofar as we do, v/e treat him as a 
person, as one of us. When, however, we treat someone 
as if he were constrained instead by causes which fall 
outside of our realm of norms, we treat him as an 
object, and therefore as one alienated from us. The 
crux of Brandom's argument is that the distinction 
between treating something or someone as a member of 
our (or any) community or as not rests upon the judg-
ment of the community and is therefore a distinction 
that is socially made. It is not an objective fact 
whether or not v/e should treat someone as a member of 
our community but a social matter, one upon which only 
the community as a whole is qualified to decide.111J 
The implications that this theory has for the in-
terpretations of individuals as free within the com-
munity setting are as follows: We seek to understand 
the practices (utterances, actions, decisions) of 
various individuals not by causally explaining them but 
by translating them into the 'language1 of our ov/n 
practices, seeing how they fit into the v/eb of v/hat we 
accept as appropriate within the community as a v/hole. 
To be constrained by norms rather than causes, to be 
treated as a member of a community, is what it is to be 
free. 
Our talk about human freedom is thus a rather 
misleading way of talking about the difference 
between the way in which we treat members of our 
own community, those v/ho engage in social prac-
tices with us, and the attitude we adopt tov/ard 
those things we manipulate causally.(12| 
Brandom points out that Hegel saw as Kant's failure 
the non-grounding of norms and therefore of freedom in 
the content of those norms. Consequently, freedom v/as 
doomed to be merely formal and abstract. It was im-
possible then, for Kant to construct a science of 
society. It is precisely this point which Hegel at-
tacks in order to make the concept of community 
possible.(13] In admiration of Kant's well-developed 
concept of morality, Hegel seeks its synthesis with the 
Aristoteleän portrayal of ethical life.(14) Hegel 
found the content of norms for which he sought in their 
particular expressions in different cultures.(15) In 
effect, it is not just any norm to which an individual 
must adhere but adherence to the norms which will make 
him one of us, and each community is seen to be unique 
with regard to the norms it calls its own. 
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The community is autonomous by virtue of •its 
having, holding, and applying a particular set of 
norms. Individuals are free by way of the community, 
because they participate in the normative structure of 
the community and consider themselves socially embedded 
rather than constrained by causal laws. But the norms 
of a community must not be thought of as static. The 
community will appreciate and absorb change which ap-
pears in the form of freedom expressing itself over and 
above the communal norms. Certain unique practices of 
an individual or group will not be considered abnormal 
or unusual but will follow immediately or freely from 
the tendency toward newness and progressive and pur-
poseful change. Freedom is thus the capability to in-
duce normative change in the community, the capacity to 
introduce novel practices.[16] 
It is by virtue of participating in a certain set 
of social practices that an individual acquires the 
ability both to produce novel practices and to under-
stand the novel behavior of others. Constraint by a 
set of norms is in fact a necessary condition for 
novelty, or for enlargement upon what is already ac-
cepted by the community.[17] 
The capacity of the individual for novel behavior 
must be maintained or exercised in order that both the 
individual and the community may continually evolve. 
Both self and social unit are thus cultivated and con-
stantly enriched. This evolution is one that builds 
itself dialectically. Through every novel dimension in 
which the community is enlarged, new explorations are 
made possible. New desires, intentions, actions, and 
decisions on the part of individuals become acceptable 
to the community where they would previously have been 
inconceivable. Development in an historical sense is 
included in this framework. Again we can look to the 
basic principle of the inherent rationality of the in-
dividual within his community to see in what sense this 
is so. 
Individuals may choose freely but not arbitrarily. 
They choose rationally and within the bounds of a par-
ticular set of norms which characterizes their com-
munity culturally. Historically, these norms represent 
an attempt on the part of the community to substantiate 
themselves as a moral whole. This attempt on the part 
of the community and its members to characterize their 
system as complete, to claim that it "contains. . 
the possibility of a life of freedom under universal 
moral laws"(18], contradicts the actual existence of a 
set of prevalent norms, which delimit the boundaries of 
social practices, however indistinct these may be. 
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This contradiction is that which dialectically propels 
each community forward to novel behavior wherein new 
norms are accepted and utilized, and a new and higher 
level of rational life is achieved.(19) 
Cultural development is thus a dialectical ex-
hibition of the phenomenon of forward movement. 
Rationality is the element through which the community 
views and evaluates itself. Freedom is that which is 
capable of recognizing and utilizing rationality, so 
that both the individual and the community may become 
more conscious of themselves. Through freedom they 
seize their rationality more and more, seek to be at 
one with it and find that it is evident everywhere in 
the world around them. Freedom is also the ability to 
supersede, to be unique, creative, novel, to advance, 
progress, to move forward dialectically such that at no 
point in the life of an individual, a community, a 
people, or the history of the world is a moment re-
peated. This non-repetition however, is a patterned 
developing flow in which every moment is dependent both 
on what has gone before, and in a more limited sense, 
what is to come. 
Hegel's own words from the Philosophy of Right will 
help sum up some of the ideas I have tried to convey: 
(S)ince mind is implicitly and actually 
reason, and reason is explicit to itself in mind 
as knowledge, world history is the necessary 
development, out of the concept of mind's freedom 
alone, of the moments of reason and so of the 
self-consciousness and freedom of mind. This 
development is the interpretation and actual-
ization of the universal mind. 
The history of mind is its own act. Mind is 
only what it does, and its act is to make itself 
the object of its ov/n consciousness. In history 
its act is to gain consciousness of itself as 
mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation 
of itself to itself. This apprehension is its 
being and its principle, and the completion of 
apprehension at one stage is at the same time the 
rejection of that stage and its transition to a 
higher. To use abstract phraseology, the mind 
apprehending this apprehension anew, or in other 
words returning to itself again out of its rejec-
tion of this lower stage of apprehension, is the 
mind of the stage higher than that on which it 
stood in its earlier apprehension.(20] 
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The history of the mind (World Mind or World Spirit) is 
described by Hegelian forward movement as dialectical. 
The mind's history is the uncovering of rationality in 
all aspects of the world, most especially in the mind's 
coming to recognize its own rationality, its becoming 
conscious of itself. Freedom does not oppose natural 
necessity, but rather characterizes the movement of 
mind through life during which the physical world is to 
be understood at every turn as a manifestation of the 
rational in the objective realm, or as rationality 
concretized. Mind is free, mind is active, coming to be 
and evolving. It is continually new, continually chang-
ing, and overall, progressive. The development of mind 
thus constitutes history. To comprehend this forward 
moving in its implications at many levels is to grasp 
the purposive flux which is the foundation of the 
Hegelian system. 
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